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Standing Under CERLCA Secs. 107 and 113
STANDING FOR POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
UNDER §§ 107 AND 113 OF CERCLA
Laidlaw Waste Systems Inc. v. Mallinckrodt Specialty Chemicals'
by Edward S. Stevens
I. Introduction
One of the greatest
uncertainties in environmental litigation
is standing under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA).2 The issue is not whether a
certain person is able to bring suit under
the act, but whether that person,
specifically a potentially responsible
party (PRP), will be able to pursue a
contribution action under § 107 of
CERCLA, which imposes joint and
several liability.3 If the PRP is not
granted standing under § 107, the PRP
is relegated to an action under § 113.4
In Laidlaw, the U.S. Distfict Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri added
itself to the list of courts which allow
PRPs to pursue actions under either
statute.
This decision represents more
than a mere technical or inconsequential
aspect of CERCLA liability. Standing
under § 107 for plaintiff-PRPs gives such
plaintiffs numerous advantages, greatly
increasing their chances of obtaining a
full recovery. This holding also reflects
policy judgments concerning the
cleanup of hazardous substances in the
United States. This Note contends that
the ruling in Laidlaw was consistent
with the stated purpose of CERCLA,
which is to promote the prompt and
efficient remediation of contaminated
sites.' This Note, also, analyzes various
commentators' proposals to amend
CERCLA which attempt to solve the §§
107/113 problem. Finally this Note
discusses ways in which the courts, in
the absence of statutory amendment,
can follow the lead of the Laidlaw court
and solve the 107/113 dispute in a way
which encourages the voluntary
remediation of contaminated sites.
II. Facts and Holding
From October, 1983, to May,
1991, plaintiffs, Laidlaw Waste Systems
Inc.,'owned and operated a licensed and
permitted sanitary landfill site in
Belleville, Illinois.7 During this time, the
Illinois Environmental Protection
Agency (IEPA) issued a supplemental
waste stream permit for the site to accept
and dispose of celite-darco filter cake
("filter cake"), a nonhazardous
substance under § 101 of CERCLA.
Defendants Mallinckrodt Inc. and
Mallinckrodt Chemical, Inc.
("Mallinckrodt") and their corporate
predecessor Mallinckrodt Specialty
Chemicals Company arranged to have
Laidlaw transport and dispose of their
filter cake, representing to plaintiffs that
it was a nonhazardous substance for
CERCLA purposes.'. During this
relevant period of time, plaintiffs
accepted and disposed of the material
at the Belleville site.'o Some time later,
defendants revealed that their filter cake
contained unacceptable levels of
barium and chromium and was therefore
a hazardous substance as defined in §
101(14) of CERCLA."
On June 28, 1995, plaintiffs
entered into a Consent Order with
Illinois.2 Laidlaw did not admit any
violations by entering into the Order."
The Order required plaintiffs to remove
and remedy releases or threats of
releases at the site.'" Mallinckrodt's
corporate predecessor entered into a
similar Consent Order based on an
action to recover civil penalties, but not
response costs." Plaintiffs then
initiated this action in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri. Laidlaw brought a complaint-
against Mallinckrodt, seeking
declaratory relief under § 107 of
CERCLA' 6 (Count 1); private cost-
recovery under § 107 of CERCLA
(Count II) or; in the alternative
contribution under § 113 of CERCLA"
'925 F. Supp 624 (E.D.Mo 1996).
242 U.S.C. Secs. 9601-75 (1995)
342 U.S.C. Sec. 9607.
'42 U.S.C. Sec. 9613.
5Dickerson v. U.S., 834 F.2d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1987).
6Laidlaw, 925 F. Supp. at 624. Plaintiffs consist of two corporations. Both are named Laidlaw Waste Management Inc. but one is
incorporated in Missouri ("Laidlaw Belleville") and the other is a Delaware corporation ("Laidlaw"). Id. at 627.
1d. at 628. Laidlaw Belleville owned the site. Id.
1Id.
Id. Defendant made similar assertions to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601.0ld.
"Id. See, 42 U.S.C. sec 9601(14). The record does not indicate exactly when this disclosure was made.21d.




6See, 42 U.S.C. sec. 9607.
"See, 42 U.S.C. sec. 96I3.
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(Count III).'8 Defendants moved to
dismiss all of the counts pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)
(6).19 The motion was treated as one for
summary judgment because defendant
asserted matters outside the pleadings
in support of the motion.2 0 The motion.
therefore, could be granted if all the
information before the court showed
that there was no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Defendants argued that
Counts 1, 11 and III should be dismissed
because defendant's Consent Order
with the Illinois Environmental
Protection Agency precluded the cost-
recovery and contribution claims.
CERCLA § 113 (f)(2) states:
Any person who has resolved
its liability to the United States
or a State in an administrative
or judicially approved
settlement shall not be liable
for claims for contribution
regarding matters addressed in
the settlement. Such
settlement does not discharge
any of the other potentially
liable persons unless its terms
so provide. but it reduces the
potential liability of the others
by the amount of the
settlement.2
Because the Consent Order between
Mallinckrodt and IEPA covered only
civil penalties and not response costs.
the court held that Laidlaw was not
precluded from bringing cost-recovery
and contribution claims."
Finally, defendants argued that
plaintiff lacked standing under § 107 of
CERCLA because Laidlaw, as owner
and operator of the site, was itself a
PRP" Plaintiff alleged that an action
under § 107 is not limited to"innocent'
parties. 6
The court had to choose
between restricting PRP standing to
contribution actions or giving PRPs the
benefit ofjoint and several liability under
§ 1070 Although the court recognized
that at least two federal circuit courts of
appeals have ruled to the contrary.17 the
court held that "ItIhe plain language of
§s 107 and 113 does not indicate that
PRPs are prohibited from bringing claims
pursuant to § 107."" Accordingly. the
court permitted plaintiffs as PRPs to
continue vith their § 107 action.'
m. Legal Background
A. CERCLA Standing Before the 1986
SARA Amendments
The § 113 contribution cause
of action did not exist until Congress
enacted the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in
1986.30 SARA reauthorized CERCLA
and modified many of its §s. Before
1986. the § 107 cost recovery action
controlled both general claims and
contribution claims. The statute
provided liability for "any other
necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan."" The use
of the term "any other person" was
treated by courts as evidence of
legislative intent to permit recovery by
private PRPs." Courts used this broad
language to allow contribution claims
under § 107."
The courts also determined
that the legislative history of the original
CERCLA indicated an intent for common
law tort principles to govern liability
under § 107.14 The courts. using the
common law irinciple that liable parties
are jointly and severally liable when the
harm is indivisible." frequently held
defendants jointly and severally liable
under § 107.36 The courts placed upon
defendants the burden of proving that
the injury was divisible." This burden
was dilicult to bear because waste at
18925 F. Supp. 624 at 626. Laidlaw also brought five additional counts, requesting damages for breach of contract (Count IV),
misrepresentation (Count V), nuisance (Count VI), negligence (Count VII) and negligent misrepresentation (Count VIII). The court
dismissed the misrepresentation claim (Count V) and found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to Counts IV, VI, Vil and
VIII.
19 d. F.R.C.P. 12 (bX6) provides for dismissal when plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
"Id. See, Woods v. Dugan, 660 F.2d 379 at 380 (8th Cir. 1981).
21Id.
22Id.
2342 U.S.C. 9613 (f) (2).
2925 F. Supp. 624 at 631.
"Id.
"See, infra note 33.
"925 F. Supp. 624 at 630.
291d.
"Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, P.L. 99-499, 100 stat. 1613.
42 U.S.C. sec. 9607 (a) (4) (B).
"Walls v. Waste Resource Corp., 761 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1985), Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984). See also,
Ann Alexander, Standing Under Superfundsecs. 107and 13: Avoiding the Error ofte Blind. lan and the Elephant, 10 TOXICs L REP.
(BNA) 155 (July 12, 1995) [hereinafter "Standing Under Superfund"J.
" See, Borough ofSayreville v. Union Carbide Corp., 923 F.Supp. 671 (D.N.J. 1996).
"Richard Buckley, Making a Case for Stat utorv Amendment to the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation and
Liability Act: Solving the Section 1071Section 113 Cause ofAction Controversy, 31 TuJISA L..J. 851, 855 (1996).
"See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 433A (1979) (apportionment permissible if rational basis exists to make division of
harm).
"Standing Under Superfund, supra note 32 at 159.
"See. United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 at 809 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
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the sites was constantly commingled.
Therefore, few cases resulted in several
liability." Trials were bifurcated: courts
initially made a decision regardingjoint
and several liability and then allocated
the cleanup costs to each defendant."
Prior to the enactment of
SARA, courts uniformly allowed claims
for contribution under § 107 and,
despite the common law rule that applied
several liability to contribution claims,
almost always imposed joint and several
liability. This simplicity would not last
long; in 1986. via SARA, Congress
chose to codify the right to
contribution."0 This codification created
conflicting views in the courts on the
availability ofjoint and several liability
under § 107.
B. SARA
In 1986. Congress set out to
"confirm" the pre-existing judicial
decisions which gave "potentially
responsible parties . . . a right of
contribution under CERCLA."4 '
Congress chose not to amend § 107 to
create such a cause of action. but rather
enacted an entirely separate provision,
§ 113 (f). 2 § 113 (f)(1) reads: "Any
person may seek contribution from any
other person who is liable or potentially
liable under § 1107(a)] of this title. during
or following any civil action under §
11061 of this title or under § [I 07(a) of
this title."" After the passage of§ 113.
courts struggled to determine whether
the original § 107 action was subsumed
in § 113 or whether PRPs now had a
choice as to which action to pursue."
There are numerous rewards
to a PRP who is allowed to pursue a §
107 cost-recovery action. First, the
statute of limitations under § 107 is six
years, which does not start running until
the "initiation of physical on-site
construction of the remedial action." 5
By contrast. the contribution action
under § 113 must be brought within
three years of either a cost recovery
action or an administrative order." A
second advantage of a § 107 cost
recovery action is the availability ofjoint
and several liability." Liability in the
contribution action, as with all
contribution actions, is only several."
The availability of.joint and several
liability reduces the likelihood that the
plaintiff PRP will be forced to bear the
cleanup costs attributable to defunct,
bankrupt or otherwise judgment-proof
parties." Several liability on the other
hand only holds defendants liable for
their share of the cleanup costs. 0
Another benefit of § 107 to
plaintiff PRPs is that only § 113 provides
immunity for parties who have settled
with the government." Finally, if the
plaintiff is allowed to bring a cost-
recovery action, the defendant is
permitted to assert only the defenses
enumerated in § 107 (b)." Under § 107
(b), defendant can assert that the
damages resulted from an act of God.
an act of war, or "an act or omission of a
third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one
whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual
relationship . .. with the defendant.""
The defendant in the contribution
action, however. can assert other
equitable, non-statutory defenses." For
these reasons, § 107 is the more
desirable cause of action for the plaintiff
PRP.
The first federal circuit court
of appeals to specifically address
whether or not a plaintiff PRP could
receive the benefits of a simple cost-
recovery action after SARA" was the
Seventh Circuit in A kzo Coatings, Inc.
v. Aigner Corp." In that case the
plaintiff had been one of thirty-five
companies ordered by the EPA to
cleanup the site, pursuant to § 106."
After the cleanup, plaintiffs brought suit
against a PRP that the EPA had not
included in its § 106 recovery action."
That court denied plaintiff standing
"Standing Under Superfund, supra note 32 at 160.39Id.
4042 U.S.C. § 9613 (f).
41H. R. Rep. No. 167, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, (1985).
4242 U.S.C. 9613 (f)
4342 U.S.C. 113 (f) (1)
"See, supra note 33 and accompanying text.
4542 U.S.C. 9613 (g) (2) (13). Note that for removal actions, the cost recovery suit must he brought within three years of completion of
the removal action. 42 U.S.C. 9613 (g)(2) (A).
442 U.S.C. 9613 (g) (3) (A) and (B).
4
'See, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
4 42 U.S.C. I13(f).
"David Barnhizer, Recent Development: Joint and Several Liabilitr and Contribution 1ider CERCIA Sections 107 (a) (4) (B) and 113
() (1). 18 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 563 at 570 (1994).
5042 U.S.C. 113(f).
"See, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
5242 U.S.C. 107 (b) (1), (2), (3).
"Id.
"See, Barnhizer, supra note 49, at 565.
"But see, Amoco v. Borden, 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989). The point was apparently not disputed. The Fifth Circuit stated that, once
liability is established (between PRPs), § 113 must be applied. See also, In Re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991).
Other courts used language suggesting the same result without specifically holding so.





under § 107, stating that plaintiffs "claim
remains one by and between jointly and
severally liable parties for an
appropriate division of the payment one
of them has been compelled to make.
Akzo's suit accordingly is governed by
§ 113(f)."' 9 The Akzo court did not,
however, hold that § 107 was limited to
actions by governmental authorities. It
suggested that "a landowner forced to
clean up hazardous materials that a third
party spilled onto its property or that
migrated there from adjacent lands"
might still be able to bring a § 107 cost-
recovery action.' The Seventh Circuit
greatly restricted what the type of
plaintiff to have standing under § 107
after the enactment of SARA.
The First Circuit confronted
the same issue in United Technologies
Corp. v Browning-Ferris Industries.6'
Because the § 113 statute of limitations
had expired and the § 107 statute had
not, resolution of the PRP standing issue
was outcome-determinative.62 In
reaching its conclusion, the court relied
heavily on Congress' use of the term
"contribution" in § 113.6 By finding
that Congress intended that the term be
used in its conventional sense- a claim
by and between jointly and severally
liable parties - the court held that any
CERCLA claim falling within that
definition was governed by § 113.1 The
court also stated that cost-recovery
actions are available only to "innocent"
parties." The court listed only federal.
state and local governments as examples
of innocent parties.' Therefore, the
First Circuit defined a contribution claim
as not just a claim between PRPs. but
rather any claim between PRPs.'
Many United States District
Courts, however have disagreed with
these courts and found a valid cause of
action to exist for PRPs under § 107."
For example, the court in Chesapeke &
Potomac Tele. Co. v. Peck Iron & A fetal
Co..' stated:
Nothing in the statute supports the
assertion that only the United
States Government or an 'innocent'
plaintiff can bring a cost recovery
action under § 107 (a). To the
contrary, the statute specifically
provides thit covered persons
shall be liable to both the United
States Government, among others,
and to 'any other person' who
incurs response costs."o
In response to defendants' argument
that plaintiff should not be rewarded for
winning the race to the courthouse, the
court only held defendants jointly and
severally liable for the costs attributable
to defendants. In other words. the §
107 action did not relieve plaintiff of its
already apportioned liability. it merely
held the defendants. as a group. jointly
and severally liable amongst
themselves.7 1 Plaintiffs would., in the
contribution phase of the proceeding.
still be assigned some of the "orphan
shares," those portions of the cleanup
costs that were attributable to judgment-
proof defendants.' The court admitted
that other courts which do not saddle
plaintiffs with a portion of these
"orphan shares," encourage "private
parties to clean up hazardous waste
sites, to risk their own capital initially.
knowing that by prevailing in a § 107
action they will be reimbursed perhaps
in excess of what might be shown in a §
113 action to have been their equitable
share."" The court recognized the
potential value of such incentives. but
nonetheless elected to reduce plaintiffs'
potential windfall.
Another United States District
Court which allowed a § 107 action by
PRPs. however, did not similarly restrict
the plaintiff's windfall. The court in
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer7 1
followed Chesapeke Bay with respect
to plaintiff's standing under § 107. but
declined to saddle plaintiffs with any
orphan shares in its allocation of
recovery costs." The court defined an
91d. at 764.
6oId. Commentators point out that actions of this type are so rare that the Akzo court might as wvell have limited cost-recovery actions
to govemental plaintiffs only. Standing Under Superfund, supra note 32 at 168.




67See also, U.S. v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad Company, 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir.1995)(on similar facts, following thited
Technologies).
"Adhesives Research Inc. v. American Inks & Coatings Corp., 931 F. Supp. 1231 (C.D. Pa. 1996), Pneuno Abex Corp. v. Bessemer,
921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.Va. 1996), Charter Township of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 910 F. Supp. 332 (W.D. Mich 1995),
U.S. v. SCA Services, 849 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. hid. 1994), Companies for Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D.Conn.
1994), Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 861 F. Spp. 931 (C.D.Cal 1993), Chesapeke and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia
v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D.Va. 1992), U.S. v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991), and 13urlington





"Id. at 1278 (quoting U.S. v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397 at 416).
'921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.Va. 1996).
"Id. at 347.
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orphan share as "any portion of liability
that is not attributable to Plaintiffs or an
available PRP."7 6 Although the court
did not explain its reason for not
following Chesapeke Bay. it is now
apparent that even in the jurisdictions
that allow plaintiff-PRPs a cause of
action under § 107. there is a split of
opinion concerning plaintiff's ability to
receive the full benefit of joint and
several liability under § 107.
Courts have reached varying
results concerning the availability of
cost-recovery actions under § 107 after
the SARA amendments. Every federal
circuit court of appeals to address the
issue has decided that Congress's
enactment of a separate contribution
provision was evidence of legislative
intent to have all claims among PRPs
governed by that contribution
provision. These courts still disagree,
however, on just what type of non-
governmental plaintiff can still bring a
cost-recovery action." The several
district courts that have ruled to the
contrary, although somewhat
inconsistent among themselves, 8 make
the number of cases on each side of the
issue about even.
What is really at dispute in this
controversy is the allocation of orphan
shares. Although the Browning-Ferris
court had to deal with the divergent
statutes of limitations, and contribution
protection can be very important to a
defendant who has settled with the
government, plaintiffs are continually







































they can minimize their defendant was responsible for the
phan shares. Some of the contamination, the court asserted that
tioned above are explicit once a defendant's liability is
tion of this dispute. while established, "the focus shifts to
to give parties and allocation. Allocation isa contribution
clear guidance on the claim controlled by 42 U.S.C. 9613."I
Recognizing that a federal district court
outside of the Eighth Circuit interpreted
ecision Control Data to mean that § 113
aidlaw v. Mallinckrodt, governs any cost-recovery suit by a
ict Court for the Eastern PRRM the court declined to follow the
souri held that a PRP may lead of the district court because it found
cost-recovery action or that the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
ution against other PRPs. did not directly address the standing
his conclusion, the court issue in Control Data." Especially
ed both plaintiffs' and convincing to the court was the fact that
,otential liability under the plaintiff in Control Data did not
3ecause Laidlaw was the bring a claim under § 107 for cost-
erator of the facility. and recovery.88  Also persuasive to the
had contracted for the Laidlaw court was the fact that the
zardous waste, both were Control Data court, in support of the
otentially liable parties statement quoted above, did not cite
A.' The court noted that any existing case law from other
107 action was allowed to jurisdictions which denied PRPs
endants would be held standing under§ 107.1
everally liable, absent a The court also relied on
visibility of injury8' The another Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
at several liability rarely decision and one United States Supreme
ost-recovery actions Court decision." These cases
bility is a "a very difficult influenced the court, not by their
establish.""' reasoning or the language in their
court first considered holdings, but rather through what the
argument that only an two courts failed to say. In General
y may bring an action Electric v Litton,9' the Eighth Circuit
I The court focused on permitted a cost-recovery claim by a
ircuit Court of Appeal's plaintiff who had previously entered
ontrol Data v S.C.S.C. into a Consent Decree with a state
ugh the central issue in agency, against a PRP. The issue of
ia.- was whether.- thestanding was not contend fby either
6 1.
"See, supra note 55 and accompanying text.
"See. supra note 68 and accompanying text. Considering the size of the jurisdictions that the courts of appeals govern, it becomes
apparent that a majority of courts deny plaintitlTPRPs standing under § 107.
71925 F. Supp. 629.
042 U.S.C. 9607 (a)(1 -(4).
"Id. at 626.
"'Id. (quoting Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995).
83925 F. Supp. at 629
"Control Data, 53 F.3d 930.
81d. at 935.
86925 F. Supp. at 629. Gould v. A & M Battern and Tire Service., 901 F. Supp. 906 at 913 (M.D.Pa. 1995).
97Id.
"Id.
'General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Systmes, Inc., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990), Key Tronic v. U.S., 511 U.S. 809
(1994).
9'925 F. Supp. at 630.
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party, and the court did not address the
issue in its opinion." Similarly. in Key
Tronic v. U.S.," the United States
Supreme Court ruled on the availability
of attorney's fees under CERCLA." The
standing issue was not disputed, but
the case involved a plaintiff who had
disposed of hazardous wastes in a
landfill." Plaintiff asked for contribution
under § 113, and additional response
costs under § 107." The Supreme Court
did not object to the PRP cost-recovery
suit, but only held that § 107 did not
allow the recovery of attorney's fees.97
In dicta, the Supreme Court stated that
the two §s provide for "somewhat
overlapping" remedies." The Laidlaw
court reasoned that, were the Eighth
Circuit and the Supreme Court to
oppose cost-recovery claims by PRPs,
they would have addressed that issue
in their opinions."
The court then went on to
ascertain the plain meaning of the two
statutory §s."o0 As noted above, the
court failed to find anything in the two
statutes that indicated that PRPs could
not bring a§ 107 action."o' § 107 allows
recovery of necessary response costs
incurred "by any other person."" 2 The
court agreed with another district court
that this language "implie[d] that
Congress intended the liability of the
provision to sweep broadly."'o3
Furthermore, the court found no
requirement in § 107 that the plaintiff
be "innocent."'"
The court did not address
whether a plaintiff would be
apportioned some of the orphan shares
from unavailable defendants.'
Because the court was ruling on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, that issue probably would not
arise until the apportionment phase of
the proceedings. occurring later in the
trial.'"
Accordingly. because of the
absence of statutory language to the
contrary. the higher courts' failure to
object to similar claims, and
unpersuasive rulings by the other
federal courts of appeals. the court held
that PRPs can bring cost-recovery
actions against other PRPs under § 107.
V. Comment
This comment proposes two
ways in which the courts can more fairly
and effectively handle suits among
PRPs. The goal of both concepts is to
encourage the swift remediation of sites
and promote certainty among parties
and practitioners concerning liability for
orphan shares, thereby facilitating the
efficient resolution of litigation. The
first involves a statutory amendment to
CERCLA, and the second proposes
ways that the courts, in the absence of
statutory amendments, can effectuate
the legislative intent of CERCLA.
Several commentators have suggested
ways to accomplish the aforementioned
goals. Some of their proposals are
discussed in this Section.
A. Statutory Amendment Proposals
One commentator asserts that
Congress should never have added §
113 in 1986.10 Because the SARA
amendments only added more
confusion to the issue, this
commentator argues that the entirety of
§ 113 be repealed.'" In its place.
Congress should insert a provision.
presumably in § 107, comparable to the
open-ended provision for privilege in
the Federal Rules of Evidence.'" This
provision would direct the courts to
apply common law principles of
contribution to cost recovery actions
under § 107.o"' One consequence of the
deletion of § 113 would be that parties
who have settled with the government
would no longer receive the
contribution protection contained in the
statute.
This proposal is flawed in two
respects. The commentator contends
that the deletion of contribution
protection will help ensure that polluters
pay their fair share of the cleanup
costs."' But if PRPs have no incentive
to settle with the government and the
EPA, with already limited resources,
must litigate more enforcement actions
under § 106. the net result will be that
even fewer sites get cleaned up. The
polluters may end up paying their fair
share but it comes at the cost ofjudicial
and administrative efficiency. The









'Id. See, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
'e2Id.
'"Id. (quoting CompaniesforFairAllocation, 853 F. Supp. 575 at 579).
'"Id.
'"See, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
'"However, had the court given some indication of its position on the apportionment of orphan share liability, it may have helped the
parties ascertain their respective bargaining positions for purposes ofa settlement.






Standing Under CERLCA Secs. 107 and 113
avoided if PRPs had incentives to settle,
may take up to a few years.
A second problem with this
proposed amendment of CERCLA is
that it fails to resolve the issue that most
needs attention. orphan share liability.
Apparently. if all actions by plaintiff
PRPs are governed by § 107. and this
section in turn applies common law
contribution principles, liability will be
several. Plaintiffs will absorb all of the
orphan shares. This puts a great deal
of discretion in the hands of the EPA
who will decide against which PRP to
bring a § 106 action, knowing that its
choice will create a windfall for unnamed
PRPs, and may push the named ones
into bankruptcy. This is incongruent
with one goal of CERCLA. making
responsible parties pay their fair share,
which the commentator purports to
effectuate through the deletion of §
113.12
A second commentator has
proposed that CERCLA be amended by
repealing § 113 in its entirety.
specifically granting joint and several
liability under § 107, and inserting the
following language in § 107 (a) (4) (D):
"In an action under this §. the United
States. a State or any person who has
resolved its liability to the United States
or a State in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement may seek
cost recovery from any person who is
liable or potentially liable under this §
who has not so resolved its liability.
The actions for recovery under this Act
are limited to the actions enumerated
under this " "
This proposal allows only
PRPs who have settled to pursue cost
recovery actions. The only possible
defendants in such an action are
recalcitrant PRPs. PRPs who have
refused to settle. This proposal would
provide a PRP with enormous incentives
to settle. and would accordingly reduce
the number of CERCLA claims that
actually make it to trial. The idea is that
a PRP who has funds that it wants to
protect will settle. and avoid being
saddled with orphan share liability.
One problem with this scheme
is that it would push all PRPs to settle.
and unless the government
overestimates a party's liability to
compensate for orphan shares. the
government will not recover the orphan
share liability from any party. The only
type of PRP that would not settle would
be an insolvent one, or one who
believes that the government's offer
attributed entirely too much liability to
them. Furthermore, the government
would again have absolute control over
a PRP's fate. A PRP would have no
bargaining power because the
government could choose not to settle,
or to offer it an unreasonable settlement,
and then that PRP. after being held liable
to a private-PRP in a § 107 action, would
be left without any cause of action.
Under the current scheme. the
government knows that a PRP might. in
some jurisdictions, just accept several
liability or, in other jurisdictions. risk
being held jointly and severally liable
and later pursue a § 113 action. courts
to reward settling PRPs and penalize
recalcitrant PRPs in allocating orphan
share liability, this proposal provides
PRPs with incentives to settle. thereby
reducing litigation and facilitating the
prompt remediation of hazardous sites.
When this is coupled with the spreading
of orphan share liability among all
solvent PRPs. PRPs can better assess
the costs and benefits of their actions.
They can accept responsibility and enter
into a settlement or refuse to settle,
knowing that the court is statutorily
authorized to apportion them a greater
amount of orphan share liability.
A final suggested statutory
amendment to CERCLA is superior to
the previous two in several respects.
Under this proposal, § 107 would remain
unaltered, and § 113 would not be
elinjatEd.14 § 113 (f) (1) would be
amended in the following way (amending
language in italics):
[THESE AMENDMENTS BEGIN
AFTER THE FIRST TWO
COMPLETE SENTENCES OF 9613
(f) (1), WHICH SHOULD BE
RETAINED.] In resolving
contribution claims under this § or
cost recovery claims under § 9607
(a) (4) (B) of this title, the court
may allocate response costs among
potential/v responsible parties
using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate.
provided that the court shall
distribute liability for "orphan
shares" (uncollectible shares
attributable to persons lacking
the ability to pay for their
equitable share of response costs)
among all solvent PRPs
according to their respective
equitable shares, and provided
further that in determining
equitable shares with respect to
distribution of liability at NPL
sites, the court should look
favorably on potentially
responsible parties that have
resolved their liability with the
United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially
approvedRD/RA Consent Decree
and look harshly upon potentially
responsible parties that failed to
resolve their liability with the
United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially
approved RD/RA Consent Decree
after being given a reasonable
opportunitytodoso. [THE LAST
SENTENCE OF § 9613 (f) (1)
SHOULD BE RETAINED]."
This proposed amendment
encourages settlements and the prompt
remediation of sites because it does not
eliminate § 113 and its accompanying
contribution protection. While doing
this. it does not take the contribution
"II2d.
"'Ivy Barton-Wagner, Setting CERCLI Straight: .4 Solution to the Dispute OverActions by Liable Renediators Under § 107and §
113, 14 TEmp. ENvn. L. & TECH. J. 207 at 222(1995).
" Jerome M. Organ, Superfind and the Settlement Decision: Reflections on the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiencv,62 G.





protection to an extreme like the
previous proposal. The settlement is
not determinative of standing in a cost
recovery action. The language "any
other person" is retained and
Congress's original intent of both
sweeping liability and broad standing
is effectuated.
This proposal also prevents
the EPA from making ridiculous
settlement offers. A recalcitrant PRP is
only punished when that PRP has
refused to settle after "being given a
reasonable opportunity to do so." This
is preferred because the efficient
remediation of sites depends on both
the PRP and the EPA acting rationally
and with more commensurate
bargaining power. The EPA will still have
a slight advantage because it knows
that the distribution of orphan shares is
dependent on the PRP entering into a
settlement, but the EPA also could run
the risk of a court deciding that its offer
was unreasonable. Such a
determination would mean that the non-
settling PRP would not be treated like a
recalcitrant PRP, and would not bear a
disproportionate share of orphan share
liability.
Finally, this proposal
addresses the most prominent problem
with the current scheme, orphan share
liability. This proposal refuses to take
liability for orphan shares to an extreme.
Recall that the court in Pneumo Abex
gave a plaintiff PRP standing under §
107 and refused to saddle the plaintiff
with any of the orphan share liability. "'
While this provides a PRP with
enormous incentives to settle, it is both
harsh and unfair for the recalcitrant PRP
to be responsible for the entirety of the
orphan share liability. Conversely.
courts that deny a plaintiff PRP standing
under § 107 and give that plaintiff only
several liability give the same recalcitrant
PRPs a windfall in the form of immunity
from orphan. share liability. This
proposal strikes a compromise. By
authorizing the court to allocate orphan
share liability among all solvent PRPs.
plaintiffs who are considering a
settlement with the EPA are assured that
they will not be left "holding the bag"
for liability that would normally be
attributable to insolvent or othenvise
judgment-proof polluters." Secondly,
because this aspect of the proposal
avoids putting all orphan share liability
on recalcitrant PRPs. it will force fewer
PRPs faced with significant cleanup
costs into bankruptcy.
The proposal is explicit in the
allocation of orphan share liability in that
it directs the courts on just how to
allocate liability among PRPs at National
Priorities List (NPL) sites."' By
authorizing courts to reward settling
PRPs and penalize recalcitrant PRPs in
allocating orphan share liability. this
proposal provides PRPs with incentives
to settle. thereby reducing litigation and
facilitating the prompt remediation of
hazardous sites. When this is coupled
with the spreading of orphan share
liability among all solvent PRPs, PRPs
can better assess the costs and benefits
of their actions. They can accept
responsibility and enter into a
settlement or refuse to settle, knowing
that the court is statutorily authorized
to apportion them a greater amount of
orphan share liability.
One problem with this
proposal is that it differentiates between
NPL sites and non-NPL sites. There
should be no difference in the
incentives involved in entering into a
settlement concerning an NPL site and
settlement at non-NPL sites. There is
nothing concerning a greater risk to
health and the environment (factors
considered in placement on the NPL).
that warrants disparate treatment. A
statutory amendment to § 113 may do
better to treat the parties involved in
settlements at both NPL and non-NPL
sites exactly the same.
These proposed statutory
amendments to CERCLA obviously
depend on Congress's taking the
initiative to solve the orphan share
liability problem. In the absence of
action by Congress, or until that
legislation is passed. there is a way in
which courts (that are not bound by
precedent stating unambiguously that
actions among PRPs are governed
solely by § 113) can effectuate the swift
and cfficient remediation of sites.
B. A Proposal to Solve the Orphan
Share Problem in the Absence of
Statutory Amendment
While many commentators
have focused on solving the § 107/§
113 problem through statutory
amendments, the same result can be
reached if the courts look at the
plaintiff's motivation in seeking an
action under § 107. While many courts
have taken an all or nothing approach-
an action among PRPs is either
controlled by § 107 or it is governed by
§ 113- this has led to results that are
not in accordance with congressional
intent. Once the plaintiff's motive is
ascertained, the court should attempt
to reach a result consistent with the
policies and legislative intent
surrounding CERCLA. Numerous
courts have tried to ascertain
congressional intent as a whole, finding
that Congress either intended § 107 or
§ 113 to govern claims between PRPs.
The better approach is to determine
legislative intent for each particular
claim.
For example. if the plaintiff's
motivation is to circumvent the shorter
statute of limitations that governs
contribution actions under § 113.
plaintiff should be denied standing
under § 107. On this particular issue,
legislative intent is clear because
Congress specifically enacted two
separate statutes of limitations. Courts
like Browning-Ferris may already be
doing this, but in so ruling. they have
not stated that the particular case
"'See, supra note 73 and accompanying text.
"Organ, supra note 114, at 1098.
"'The National Priorities List is a ranking of CERCLA sites most in need of remediation taking into account "the relative degree of risk
to human health and the environment..." 42 U.S.C. 9605 (c).
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demands that § 113 control. but have
rather stated that § 113 controls all such
claims." 9
When plaintiffs seek an action
under § 107 for the imposition ofjoint
and several liability, courts should
follow the lead of Chesapeke &
Potomac Tele. Co.'1" That court allowed
the plaintiff-PRP to pursue an action
under § 107 and receive joint and
several liability. The court did not,
however, allocate all orphan share
liability to the defendants. This
prevented the first party to the
courthouse from receiving a windfall.
Arguably, the court in Chesapeke &
Potomac Tele. Co. did not provide PRPs
with enough incentives to settle, like a
reduced portion of orphan share liability.
but the mere imposition of joint and
several liability avoids the perverse
incentive that would arise if all orphan
share liability were borne by the plaintiff.
It is on the issue of orphan share liability
that a statutory amendment could better
cure the ills of the present scheme than
mere judicial activism could. However,
until CERCLA is amended, courts need
not make the all-or-nothing decision
with respect to standing and orphan
share liability.
In this respect, the decision in
Laidlav was a correct one. The record
showed no evidence of a settlement
concerning issues disputed in the
lawsuit, and the statute of limitations
was not at issue. To avoid the harsh
and inequitable result that arises from
the imposition of mere several liability,
the court chose to allow the § 107 action
to proceed. What the court did not
explain in the opinion however is how
liability for orphan shares was going to
be apportioned later in trial. Had this
been discussed, the parties may well
have been able to negotiate a settlement
and voluntarily dismiss the suit.
Nonetheless the course taken by the
Laidlaw court is the correct one, given
the need to spread orphan share liability
among responsible parties, while
avoiding the perverse incentives to
settling or remediating PRPs that
accompanies several liability under §
113. This result also avoids the
inconsistency that results from
jurisdictions which limit actions under
§ 107 to "innocent" parties, and the
varying definitions of "innocent" that
accompany them.' 2'
VI. Conclusion
The split of authority
concerning standing under CERCLA §§
107 and 113 is of great magnitude given
the importance of the issues involved:
settlement protection. orphan share
liability, and the potential exclusion of
actions by the statutes of limitations.
Because courts reach such varying
results on the issue of standing, many
PRPs are uncertain as to just what the
law is in their jurisdiction and how
courts will apply CERCLA to the facts
of their controversies. This means that
fewer and fewer claims are resolved prior
to litigation because parties must
actually litigate their disputes. Until
certainty, and hopefully uniformity, are
achieved, the judicial system will
continue to be ineffective when
determining CERCLA liability.
Resolution of the orphan share
liability problem is especially crucial to
this controversy. PRPs need incentives
to settle with the government and they
also need to know that their settlement
will be given effect. This Note has
shown ways in which caks like Laidlaw
can be better decided. either through
an amendment to CERCLA or through
judicial interpretations of CERCLA that
promote both equitable and judicially
efficient results.
"
9See, supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
"oSee, supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
"'See, supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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